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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
TRADE

CO~l~IISSION

OF UTAH
Plaintiff and Respondent,'

UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIATION and GEORGE INGALLS,
d/b/a George's ~larket,
Plaintiffs in Intervention
and Respondents,

Case no.
7783

vs.
JAl\IES L. BUSH, d/b/a Bush Super
~1arket,

Defendant and Appellant .
. PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
- BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH:
Come now the plaintiffs who are respondents in the
above entitled cause and petition the Court to grant a
rehearing of this matter for the following reasons, more
particularly elaborated in the accompanying brief:
1. The Court erred by deciding in effect that the
issuance by the defendant of S & H Green Stamps, representing a two per cent cash discount, in connection with
the sale of items marked up six per cent did not violate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the "sales-below-cost" provisions of the Unfair Prac
tices Act.
2. The Court erred by deciding in effect that the
1narkup on goods required by the Unfair Practices Act
is not separately computed for each item sold.
The Court erred by treating this case, a civil
proceeding for injunctive relief, as a criminal case, thus
imposing a greater burden of proof on plaintiffs than
is required by law.
3.

The Court erred by holding that an intent by
the defendant to injure competition was not proved when
uncontradicted evidence in the record showed that such
an intent was proved.
4.

5. The Court erred by ignoring an alternative
method of proof allowed by the Unfair Practices Act,
proof that the effect of defendant's actions was to injure
competition.
6. The Court erred by holding that the only purpose
of the Unfair Practices Act is to curb monopolies whereas the plain language and intent of the Act shows that
it is also designed to promote fair methods of competition.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF' PETITION
FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are as stated in the briefs of both parties
submitted for the original hearing of this case.
2
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STATE.JIENT OF POINTS
POINT I
CASH DISCOUNTS ON SALES MARKED UP NO MORE
THAN THE STATUTORY SIX PER CENT DO REDUCE THE
SALE PRICE BELOW COST.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT THE
BELOW COST PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE DO NOT
APPLY TO EACH ITEM SOLD.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT IN THIS
PROCEEDING FOR AN INJUNCTION, A CIVIL NOT A
CRil\IINAL REMEDY, PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT WAS REQUIRED.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT AN
INTENT TO INJURE COMPETITION WAS NOT PROVED.
POINT V
THE COURT IGNORED AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD
OF PROOF OF THE VIOLATION, PROOF THAT THE
EFFECT WAS TO INJURE COMPETITION.
POINT VI
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT
ARE TO PROHIBIT UNFAIR AND DISCRIMINATORY
PRACTICES BY WHICH FAIR AND HONEST COMPETITION IS DESTROYED OR PREVENTED AS WELL AS TO
SAFEGUARD THE PUBLIC AGAINST THE CREATION OR
PERPETRATION OF MONOPOLIES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CASH DISCOUNTS ON SALES MARKED UP NO MORE
THAN THE STATUTORY SIX PER CENT DO REDUCE THE
SALE PRICE BELOW COST.

3
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With deference to the Court's opinion it is respectfully submitted that in prohibiting "sales below cost"
the Legislature did not intend, as the Court implies, that
such prohibited sales were to be determined solely by
"which of two technical and debatable accounting
philosophies maintains."
In the Unfair Practices Act with which we are
dealing here the Legislature was not speculating with
"debatable accounting philosophies" in prescribing what
was or what was not a "sale below cost." It prohibited
all sales "below cost" with the requisite intent or effect
and did not exempt from its prohibitory language sales
below the arbitrary six per cent markup as long as the
amount below the arbitrary markup was no more than
"usual and custmnary" whether by way of "cash discount" or otherwise. In plain unequivocal language the
Legislature said that "in the absence of proof of a lesser
cost" the markup on a. sale "shall be six per cent." When
the arbitrary markup rather than the actual cost of
doing business is used in establishing selling price the
markup must be six per cent and not something less than
six per cent. The Legislature did not say, nor can it
reasonably be inferred from anything it did say, that if
it is usual and customary to grant "cash discounts" the
markup on a sale need be only six per cent less whatever "cash discounts" are usual and customary. The
merchant is given the option of marking up his merchandise on one of two basis, viz: the 6% statutory markupor his actual cost of doing business but he may not use
the arbitrary markup and then make a "deduction" from

4
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that markup however small or large and regardless of
whether the deduction is or is not "'usual and customary."
\\~hen this Court savs that ''Unassailed also is
.
'
'
'
expert accounting testiinony showing that a cash discount custon1arily is considered as a non-operating
business expense, like advertising, accounting and similar expense, includable in the cost of doing business, and
also that the an1ount represented by the stamps, roughly
:2% is about the going rate of cash discounts.", does
it mean to imply that for any or even all of those reasons
"cash discounts'' do not reduce the selling price1 There
is certainly no expert accounting testimony to support
that proposition. In discussing the handling :by the
defendant in his books of account of S & H Green Trading Stmnps, :Jir. l(elly told how they were and how they
should properly be handled from an accounting standpoint. Xowhere did he say that they did or did not
reduce the selling price. The only inference which can
be drawn from his testimony however, is that they do
reduce the selling price because he stated that under
ordinary circumstances "cash discounts" were considered
as sales losses. IIis testimony at page 189 of the record
is as follows:

"Q. You may state whether or not they are
charged as an expense or how they are
charged in the record of the retail trade 1
A. There is different methods of handling cash
discounts. I would say the general accepted
practice is to handle cash discounts as a
finance and management expense.
Q. \Vould you say that is the way in Utah 1

5
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A.

Under ordinary circumstances, cash discounts
might be considered as a sales loss.

Q.

Would you say that is the prevailing practice
in the State of Utah 1

A.

Well, I would say its generally accepted as
accounting practices and as far as my experience is concerned, I would say its the prevail. .
ing practice, those that I've seen. I might
add that the accounting authorities would
support that theory, although there are some
differences in accounting authorities on it."

Mr. Kelly also testified that regardless of how "caRh
discounts" were handled from an accounting standpoint
it would make no difference on the net profit. Likewise
he testified that this defendant handled "cash discounts"
as an "operating expense" rather than as a "nonoperating business expense" which the Court states was
the custom. His testimony to that effect is found on
page 204 of the record as follows:

"Q. Would you say that in essence that charge
is treated as an operating expense 7
MR. R.AMPTON: I object to that as a leading
question.
THE COURT: I'll hear the answer.
A. Certainly it's treated in his books as an
advertising expense from what the witness
said here on the stand, which is an operating
expense.
Q. And is that in essence a proper way to treat
it from the standpojnt of sound accounting~
A. Well, I would say that that would probably
be an acceptable method from the under6
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standing that the particular n1erchant has a::;
to what it is under his circtunstances. I might
treat it a little differently from that. As I
said this morning, I think it was rnore probably in the nature of advertising or service
eost. As far as the effect on the operating
staternent is concerned and the net profit it
wouldn't make a particle of difference. It
would be exactly the same."
llr. Kelly went on further to point out precisely the
difference between advertising and insurance expenses
and the expenses incurred by the giving of "cash discounts'' by stating that in the one case the customer
receives a direct benefit and in the other he does not.
His testimony along that line is found at pages 210 and
211 of the record as follows:

"Q. Well, does the insurance of the merchant,
regardless of what the amount is, in connection with the price that the customer has
to pay, does that ever result in any benefit
to the customer~
A.

It never gets any payment to the customers.
The customer never receives anything from
it that is tangible.

Q.

And he definitely receives a right to benefit
when he receives a green stamp.

A.

That's right, he does. Quite a case, Judge."

As ~Ir. Kelly pointed out accounting authorities do
recognize different methods of handling "cash discounts"
in the books of account and that they do represent a
"price reduction." In Finney, Principles of Accounting,
\r ol. 1, page 38 is found the following:

7
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"Three different opinions are held wit}.
respect to the proper classification of cash discounts on purchases and sales:
( 1)

Cash discounts are a deduction from
the price; therefore, discounts on sales
should be deducted from sales, and discounts on purchases should be deducted
from purchases.

(2) Discounts are financial items like
interest,
treated.
(3)

and

should

be

similarly

If discounts are less than 2% they
should be treated as financial items;
if more than 2%, they should be treated
as deductions from purchases and
sales, because a rate of discount
greater than 2% is so large a:s to be
disproportionate to interest."

See also Hatfield, Accounting, pages 368-9; William
Morse Cole, Accounts, Their Construction and Interpretation, R-evised and Enlarged Edition, page 340.
The different methods of handling "cash discounts"
from an accounting standpoint are merely for the convenience of the particular merchant. The Unfair Practices Act is not concerned with that. It says merely that
when the 1nerchant employs the statutory six per cent
markup as the markup on his merchandise, there must
not be a deduction from that markup, large or small,
customary or not and whether by way of cash discount
or otherwise.
While accounting authorities differ as to the proper
method of handling "cash discounts" in the preparation
8
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of various financial statements, there is no authority
which que8tions that a ''discount" does not in fact effect
a "'reduction.'' In 26 C.J.8. 1333 the term "discount" is
defined as follows:
•• In a general sense, the term may be understood as a counting off, something taken off or
deducted, a reduction. ~lore specifically, in nlercantile transactions, an allowance on an account,
debt, de1nand, price asked, and the like, an allowance or deduction generally of so n1uch per cent
made for prepayment or for prompt payment of
a ·bill or account."
"\Vhen a "cash discount" is offered on a sale, its effect
on the sale price, as distinguished from how it may or
may not be shown in the accounting records, is to. reduce
the sales price--the custorner actually paying less and the
merchant actually receiving less on the sale. To the
effect that a "discount" is an "abatement," a "deduction,"
a "reduction," or the "difference" between the face
amount and the lower cash sales price see the following:
Napier v. John V. Farwell Co., 60 Colo. 319, 153 P. 694;
Pit·st Nat. Ba;nk v. Sherburne, 14 Ill. App. 566; Overstreet v. Ha;ncock, 177 S. vV. 217 (Tex); Carroll v. Drury,
170 Ill. 571, 49 N. E. 311; Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser,
22 S. W. 504, 116 Mo. 51; Anderson v. Cleburne Building
& Loan Ass'n, 16 S. W. 298 (Tex); National Bank v.
Johnson, 104 U. S. 271, 26 L. Ed. 742; Y oungblo·od v.
Burmingham Trust & Savings Co., 95 Ala. 521, 12 So.
579 20 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245; Neillsville Bank
v. Tuthill, 30 N. W. 154, 4 Dak. 295; Building Ass'n v.
Seegmiller, 35 Pa. 225; Industrial Savings & Loan Co. of
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Charleston v. Schultz, W. V. A., 185 S. E. 3; and, Dodge
Bros. v. United States, C. C. A. Md., 118 F. 2d 95.
Also we again respectfully cite the Court's attention
to the language of the court in Bristol-Meyers Co. v.
Picker, et al, 302 N. Y. 61, 96 N. E. 2d 177, as follows:
''Assuming that there is no essential difference between the use of trading stamps and cash
register receipts which are redeemable, and that
either may be regarded as a form of cash discount, I nevertheless cannot agree with the opinion
in the cases cited that such a discount does not
cut the sales price of an article. No matter how
one puts it, the consumer who is accorded a cash
discount in reality pays that much less for the·
article which he purchases, and this is none the
less true because the return is by way of merchandise rather than coin which may purchase
merchandise. When defendants sold plaintiff's
products at fair trade prices, and as. a part of
the same transaction gave their customers cash
register receipts having a redemption value of
2¥2% of such fair trade prices, they, in effect,
sold plaintiff's products at 2¥2% les'S than the
prices fixed. I can see no distinction between
returning to the customer a credit memorandum
of 2¥2% and giving him a cash register receipt.
And whether the discount is small or large makes
no difference-the statute forbids both."
The conclusion of the court that because a two per
cent "cash discount" is recognized by industry as usual
and customary, a reduction in the price of the article
does not therefore result, is unsound and without foundation. Here we are not dealing with "industry" generally.
The defendant in this ca:se was an admitted "cash and

10
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l'arry'' retail g-rocer. The record is void of any evidence
that it was usual and rustomary for any retail grocers,
whether "eash and carry'' or "credit and delivery" to
grant cash disrounts. The only evidence concerning
"ra~h disrounts" was that the defendant granted "cash
discounts" by Ineans of S & FI Green Trading Stamps
and testiuwny that "generally," "cash discounts" do not
exceed two per cent. Neither Mr. Kelly nor anyone else
testified that it was "nsnal and customary" for retail
grocery n1erchants to grant cash discounts and it cannot
reasonably be inferred frmn any evidence in the record
that ther·e was such a custom. It is to be noted in this
connection that the Unfair Practices Act was enacted
in 1937 and at least as far as the record in this case
reveals, neither the defendant nor any other retail grocery n1erchant granted "cash di!scounts" until shortly
before the Trade Commission attempted to enjoin the
defendant herein from making sales below cost .
.\s~uredly the Court does not wish to imply or infer that
a custom coming into being after the enactment of a
statute, even assuming auguendo that the defendant
herein did initiate a custom in the retail grocery business
of granting "cash discounts," amends or modifies an
existing statute ! ! ! It is a generally accepted rule that
a usage or custom in conflict with an existing statutory
provision is void. Moreover, no custom, however long
and generally followed, can nullify the plain meaning
and purpose of a statute. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 297.
Purportedly in justification of the assertion that a
two percent "cash discount" does not amount to a reduc-

11
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tion of the sales price the court states that there is support for the proposition that a $1.00 price is constant
''whether the cash and carry merchant returns 2¢ as a
discount" or "whether the credit merchant, for extended
credit, finally may receive $1.02 for the item." We
~eriously doubt whether the cited authorities do in fact
support such a proposition but in any event there is no
evidence in this record, by inference or otherwise, to
back up that statement. rrhe evidence is that on such
sales no merchant received any premium payment
whether $1.02 or something else and on the contrary the
uncontradicted evidence shows that on such sales the
defendant granted "cash discounts" of approximately
two per cent thus in effect receiving only $0.98.
The statements in both the majority opinion and
the separate concurring opinion that a two per cent
discount does not amount to a reduction in the price of
the article but that a discount substantially in excess
of two per cent may, because two per cent is the customary discount for cash, is unsound. In the first place,
as pointed out above, there is no evidence of any "usual
and customary" "cash discounts" in the retail grocery
business. If,urthermore a "cash discount" reducing the
arbitrary markup prescribed by the statute by any
amount however large or small would the in direct conflict with the plain meaning and purpose of the statute.
The Court apparently assumes however that such a
practice would be all right because, as the Court says,
in addition to being "usual and customary" his stamp
cost is "an element of the cost of doing busine SS intended
1

12
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by the Legislature to be one of the costs of doing busi-

ness included in the 6% Inarkup." Conceding as we do
that "eash discounts" are one of the costs of doing business. does the Court 1nean that when such discounts are
two per cent tht>y are one of the costs of doing business
but when more than two per cent they are not one of
the costs of doing business~
POINT II
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT THE
BELO\V COST PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE DO NOT
APPLY TO EACH ITEM SOLD.

The record shows, and the Court notes in its opinion,
that:
""About 25% of the iten1s are so-called 6%
items,-staples ordinarily sold by merchants at
cost as defined in the Act, * * *."
The Court further states in its opinion:
"Only one out of 1000 sales possibly could be
construed as a violation of the Act, * * *."
And again, the Court states :
"Incredible it seems that one would intend to
violate a criminal statute by inducing,-or, if you
please, 'luring to improvidence,'-a single housewife out of about 1000, with bait of 8.3¢ in cash
or 10.4¢ in merchandise on an average $5.00 purchase, occuring but once in a $5,000 sales volume.

* * ... "
It is clear frmn this that the Court is of the opinion that
a sale below cost occurs only when a single item is sold
at less than six percent or only when the average markup
of a nuwJber of items sold together is less than six per
cent. This is an erroneous interpretation of the Act.
13
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In the first place, there is no evidence that only ont
1n a thousand sales would be affected. The defendant
Bush made such a statement but on cross-examination
admitted that this was not a fact but merely an exaggeration, a loose figure of speech, an arbitrary figure not
based on his personal knowledge, and was designed only
to indicate that very few customers bought six per cent
items exclusively in a single purchase (R. 221-222).
The Court's assumption is based on an interpretation of Section 13-5-9 which provides:
"For the purpose of preventing evasion of
the provisions of this act in all sales involving
more than one item or commodity and in all sales
involving the giving of any concession of any kind
whatsoever (whether it be coupons or otherwi8e)
the vendor's or di·stributor's selling price shall
not be below the cost of all articles, products,
commodities and concessions included in such
transactions."
By its terms, this section is designed specifically to
prevent, not allow, evasions of the Act. The intent seems
clear. It is intended to prevent evasions through socalled "combination sales," "one-cent sales," bonus sales,
etc. It is common to sell two items for a single price or
two items for a single price plus one cent, for example:
two tubes of toothpaste sold as a unit for a single price
or two tubes sold for the price of one plus one cent.
'rhus, in interpreting a similar provision in the Minnesota act, the Minnesota Attorney General has declared:
"To give away a tumbler with each bottle
of gingerale purchased is not prohibited unless

14
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the price paid is below the cost of both the gingerale and the tumbler." (Opinions, Attorney General of Minnesota, ~lay :2G, 1937, 2 C.C.H. Trade
Reg. Reporter No. 8-1:28.~30).
Under the Louisiana act, the Attorney General of
Louisiana states:
.. ~\ gift iten1 of n1erchandise may be given
away in connection with the sale of another item,
but the cost of the item sold must be determined
by adding together the cost of both items." (2
C.C.H. Trade Reg. Reporter No. 8328.30).
The Attorney General of .Korth Dakota has stated:
"The act does not prohibit the sale of several
articles as a unit or a combined price where the
articles are sold as an indivisible unit and the sale
price of the unit exceeds or is equal to the combined cost." (2 C.C.H. Trade Reg. Reporter No.
8648.11).
In State v. Tankar Gas, 250 Wise. 218, 26 N.W. 2d
647, the \Yisconsin Supreme Court in construing a provision similar to Sec. 13-5-9 stated:
"The legislature sought by the unfair sales
act to prevent transactions in which considered as
a whole there was a sale of goods at less than cost
for the purpose of unfairly attracting business.
The typical loss-leader involved the sale of a
single item at less than cost in order to attract
patronage to the place of business of the advertiser. A possibility of evasion existed in the case
of the sale of various items for a combined price
or the offering of gifts in connection with the sale
of other things. A suitable prohibition would
dispose of these transactions but the legislature
did not do this. It took care of the situation by
15
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providing (1) that each itew involved must be
deemed offe-red for sale; (2) that each item must
be considered separately in relation to the cost
and price provisions and (3) that the total price
for the sale at a combined price or the sale with
a gift added must measure up to the aggregate
cost of the goods. If on this basis the transaction
falls below the standards bearing on the relation
between cost and price there is a violation. If not,
there is none."
We subrnit that Sec. 13-5-9, although not worded as
precisely as the Wisconsin statute, is designed to accomplish exactly the same result, that is, requiring- the cost
of each item to he separately computed whether offered
for a combination price, as a bonus for purchase of a
certain item or for an additional one-cent (1¢) or some
other nominal amount on condition that another item is
purchased at the same time.
In making the sale of a bag full of groceries, the
grocer does not take, for example, the fifteen articles
purchased and compute the cost of the total. It is comnwn and accepted ]mowledge that each article carries
its own markup, each of which is computed at the checkout counter in arriving at the total purchase price. Bush
himself testified that he followed such a practice (R.153).
In other words, with the exception of combination sales
and similar devices covered by Section 13-5-9, U.C.A.
1953, the below cost provision of the statute is computed
as to each item sold independently of other items which
may be sold at the same time to the same purchaser.
No other conclusion is possible in view of the terms of
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Section 13-5-7 which states in part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in business within the State of Utah to sell, offer
for sale, or advertise for sale, any article, product
or commodity at less than the cost thereof to such
vendor, • • •.''
\'l e respectfully submit that unless the below cost
provisions of the Unfair Practices Act are construed
to apply to each item sold, the Act could be so easily
evaded that it would become a nullity; and therefore
we petition the Court for a modification and clarification
of their present opinion in respect to this question.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT IN THIS
PROCEEDING FOR AN INJUNCTION, A CIVIL NOT A
CRIMINAL REMEDY, PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT WAS REQUIRED.

This case was decided upon the ground, as stated
by this Court, "that no prima facie case was established
showing that Bush intended to violate the Act-certainly
not beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court refers again
to criminal intent as follows:
"Nor can a criminal· intent be proved by
adding to such loss the Commission's suggestion
that people normally do not admit violations of
law."
And further when it said:
"Incredible it seems that one would intend
to violate a criminal statute by * • ., (Emphasis
added).
This prornpts petitioner to call the Court's attention
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to the fact that the statute in question is not in its
entirety, a penal statute which would require the application of the criminal rule of evidence, viz., that the
intent with which the violation of the act was accomplished must be shown by evidence which will convince
the trier of the facts beyond a reasonable doubt that
Bush had for his purpose the injuring of competitors
and the destruction of competition. The statute is both
penal and remedial in nature. Please note the provisions
of 13-5-14 U.C.A., 1953, wherein injunctive relief and
damages are made available to any person and the State
of Utah and wherein any plaintiff may subpoena the
books and records of any defendant, but that the information acquired from production in court of such books
and records may not "be used against the defendant
as a basis for a misdemeanor prosecution under the
provisions of this act." We think it clear, from the
remedial provisions of this Act, and from the mischief
intended by the Legislature to be remedied, that the only
time the criminal rule of evidence can be applied is
when procedurely, resort is had to the penal provisions
of the statute. The Unfair Practices Act unquestionably
falls within that category dealt with in 50 Am. Jur.,
Statutes, Sec. 423, as follows:
"Some statutes are declared to be remedial
as well as penal, and therefore to be entitled to a
liberal construction to suppress the mischief and
effect the object of the statute. On the other hand,
it has been declared that penal provisions must
be construed as such, although the general purpose or aim of the statute may be rernedial. Simi-
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larly, it has been asserted that a statute which is
penal, as well as ren1edial in its nature, must be
construed with at lea8t a reasonable degree of
strictness with respect to including anything beyond the imn1ediate scope and object of the statute, even though within its spirit, so that nothing
may be added to the act by inference or in tendInent. Another rule which has received some support is that where a statute contains remedial
and penal features, as respects the fonner it is
entitled to a liberal construction, but as to the
latter it must be strictly construed."
Fron1 the foregoing citation and the provisions of
the statute itself we think it plainly apparent that when
civil procedures are instituted under the provisions of
the .Act by any person or the State of Utah, it must
follow that the statute cannot be construed as penal and
thus require adherence to the strict rules of the criminal
law.
The Legislature could have made it mandatory that
a petitioner for injunctive relief establish its burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but it did not.
A cmnplete answer to this question is to be found in
the case of Fainblatt v. Leo Sportswear Co. (1942), 178
Misc. 760, 36 N.Y.S. 2nd 695. Therein the court was
called upon in an action under a "fair trade" law, to
decide the very question upon which your petitioner
takes issue with this Honorable Court, viz., when applying for injunctive relief under a statute which also provides criminal prosecution for the same acts sought to
be enjoined, must the petitioner for injunctive relief be
held to establish criminal intent on the part of the de-
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fendant and prove defendant's intentional violation of
the statute beyond a reasonable doubt~ The New York
Court said "No" and in part had this to say:
"It is true that this is a penal statute hut it
is also a hybrid of civil and criminal remedies,
yet capable of definite severance, the one from
the other. Thus that part of it which relates to
and grants civil remedy must be read separate
and distinct from that part of it which is penal in
character and viewed as a separate and independent enactment and construed and interpreted
accordingly."
"In a formal civil action for injunctive relief
the elements of criminal intent and reasonable
doubt are irrelevant, immaterial and unnecessary
and I arn unable to see that these elements hecome relevant, by a summary proceeding incongruously allied with a penal law."
Accord: In Re Julius Restur(JJJ1;t, Inc. v. Lombardi,
282 N.Y. 126, 25 N.E. 2d 874; State ex rel Malone v.
Fleming Co., 164 Kan. 723, 192 P. 2d 207.
Therefore, must we not conclude that the equitable
remedies allowed by the statute should be secured under
well established rules of evidence pertaining to such
remedies~ We think this conclusion inescapable, and in
consequence, that petitioner establishes his burden of
proof with evidence of merit and greater weight as in
other cases of the same nature. It is submitted petitioner
has so established his case.
We think the Court in error when it resolves the
appeal of. this case on the same ground it would had
20
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defendant been charged with and convicted of a crirne.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT AN
INTENT TO INJURE COMPETITION WAS NOT PROVED.

The statute declares that a sale below cost, made
with the intent or the effect of injuring competition and
not within one of the exemptions, is unlawful. It was
stipulated that no exemption, except possibly subsection
(d) of Section 13-5-12, U.C.A. 1953, was applicable (R.
58-59). No proof of subsection (d) was offered and,
indeed, this· exemption was expressly negatived by evidence that the price situation was staJble prior to the
issuance of the green stamps by Bush (R. 62, 83, 97, 98)~
We have discussed the issue of whether a sale below
cost was 1nade in Point I and will discuss the question
of whether the effect of the issuance of green stamps
injured competition in Point V. The present argument
is limited solely to the question of intent to injure competition.
\Vhat does intent mean in this statute~ As far as
the mere act of selling goes, it is the same whether the
sale is made above cost or below cost. It is only realistic
to say that the intent in making both types of sales is also
the same. Cutting the price of a twelve percent item by
reducing the markup to six per cent, which is lawful,
may be done with the same intent as cutting the price of a
six per cent item by reducing the markup to three per
cent, which is unlawful. In other words, malice is not
necessary. It is unrealistic in fact and contrary to what
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the Legislature must have known when the Act was passed to say that malice, i.e., ill-will or an evil design, is
required. Any seller when cutting prices does not in
fact differentiate in his mind between six per cent items
and items above six per cent. His purpose is the same
in both instances: to attract business by taking customers
away from his competitors. Therefore, the only intent
necessary is that the act of price cutting was knowingly
done by the seller with knowledge of the ordinary consequences of such actions on his competitors.
The distinction which should not be overlooked is
the Legislature, in the proper exercise of its police
powers, declared that one of these methods of attracting
business, selling below cost, is unfair competition and
unlawful. The Legislature recognized that cutting prices
is a legitimate and ordinary business practice, a normal
method of competition basic to our free enterprise
system; but they also recognized one evil of unrestrained
cmnpetition, cutting prices below cost, must be prohibited
or the competitive system itself could be destroyed.
We have used the statement "intent to attract business" instead of "intent to injure competition." The
Court places great reliance on this terminology in its
opinion. The latter phrase has an unsavory connotation
in that it seems unjust to accuse a seller of intending
to injure competition when he is conducting what is
apparently a normal and legitimate business practice
of cutting prices to attract customers. Yet in the instant
fact situation the terms are synonymous. They obviously
mean different things where the price cutter does not in
th~ t
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fact have any con1petitors. But where a cmnpetitive
situation exists, as is apparent front the facts here, it is
ridiculous to say that intending to attract business without caring whether the customers come from a competitor
(R. 5:2-53, 55, 223-221) and that some did come from his
competitors to his knowledge (R. 55) is not the same
as intending to injure competition. Where a competitive
situation does exist, any method of attracting business
such as ilnproving the physical facilities of the store,
conducting an accelerated advertising campaign, improving service, cutting prices and any number of other
methods does in fact and in purpose injure competition.
As stated in State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 33'2, 84 P. 2d 767
at 774:
"A man * • * has the undoubted and inherent
right, in order to make a living, to esta!blish an
ordinary business in a community. He will naturally and inevitably injure a competitor or competitors already there. The newcomer would not
engage in his venture except with the thought
that he would be able to get some of the business
away from the others. IIe has in all such cases,
in the very nature of things, the specific intent to
injure the latter, and in most instances, if not
all, to drive out competition as nearly as he is
able to do so."
Therefore, the fact that Bush stated his only intent was to attract business does not disprove the intent
required by the Act. On the contrary, that statement,
coupled with his statements that he intended to attract
customers even if they came from his competitors, and
that smne customers did come from his competitors to
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his knowledge, amounts to an ad1nission that he did
intend to injure competitors.
Furthermore the Court has ignored the well accepted
rule of law, applicable to both civil and criminal cases,
''that every sane man is presumed to intend the ordinary, natural, probable, or necessary consequences of
his voluntary, intentional, and deliberate act." 20 Am.
.Jur., Evidence, sec. 232.
"Wrongful intent need not and ordinarily
cannot, be established by direct evidence. 'In the
nature of things this would be so, for persons
about to engage in unlawful or questionable
undertakings are not likely to proclaim their purposes on the housetops.' Such wrongful intent,
however, may be inferred from the defendant's
acts, sometimes even despite his 'sworn protestations.' Only the acts themselves evidence the
defendant's intent, and the courts must be guided
accordingly. * * * When a defendant is chargeable with knowledge of the inevitable consequence of his conduct, it is a proper inference
that he intends them. F'or a person is ordinarily
held to intend the consequences of his acts, when
he understands his acts, and they are deliberate,
especially'."
( Callman, Unfair Competition and Trade
Marks, 2nd Ed. Vol. 4, 389.2(b))
Even if the denials of Bush as to his intent are
given the full effect claimed for by appellants of negativing the element of intent, his denials stand alone
against the otherwise uncontradicted evidence that the
issuance of stamps by Bush caused a decline in business
and a ruinous price war to the injury of his competitors.
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If the courts were to discount abundant and uncontradicted evidence of the deliberate acts of a defendant
merely because the same defendant had testified he did
not intend the consequences of his acts, intent could
never be proved.
"Wrongful intent is an extremely narrow
concept. It refers only to an unlawful act intentionally done with full knowledge of its unlawfulness. However, it should be recognized that
a defendant, who knows all the facts hut fails
to appreciate the unlawfulness of his act, is still
at fault, and his fault is tantamount to a wrongful intent. It is conceivable that a defendant
1nay not understand the law, that he may be
failing with respect to moral or ethical values,
that he may lack the insight to appreciate the
facts or the inevitable consequences of his act,
or that he may be blinded by the intensity of the
competitive struggle. He should, however, be
answerable for his conduct notwithstanding.
( Callman, supra, ~389.2 (a) )
Bush admitted that by issuing stamps he wanted
to attract business, to attract as many customers as possible whether they came from his competitors or not.
(R. 52, 53, 223-227). Bush also testified as follows

(R.45):
"Q. Mr. Bush, is the contract that you have with
Sperry and Hutchinson in the nature of an
exclusive franchise, or could your competitors likewise get contracts for the issuance
of Green Stamps~
A. You see, at the time I took on the stamps,
the one thing I was concerned about in paying out this money I would have to pay out
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for the stamps, that it certainly wouldn't be
a good thing for me if every store were able
to get the same thing, so I asked for exclusions in this, which they do give, and that
is what I insisted on before I took the stamps
on.
MR. RAMPTON: And what area do you have
"exclusive"~

A.

I have an area of fifteen blocks within each
one of my stores, * * * " (Emphasis supplied)

Obviously, Bush had in mind his competitors and the
actual effect on his competitors when he insisted on
this monopoly provision in his contract.
The consequences of the issuance of the stamps by
Bush are also clear. His competitors testified that their
volume of business declined (R. 63-64, 76-77). Mr. Van
W agenen believed his decline would force him out of
business (R. 77). Former customers of the competitors
began trading with Bush (R. 76). Some customers of
his competitors requested the competitors to install a
stamp system of their own. (R. 78). The competitors
attributed their decline in business to the issuance of
the stamps by Bush (R. 64-65, 78). On the other hand,
Bush had a substantial increase in his business after
the stamps were issued (R. 55) and he attributed his
increase to the stamps (R. 56). Also undisputed is testimony that a price war, one of the evils of the statute
was designed to prevent, resulted from the issuance of
the green stamps (R. 65-66, 72-74, 85-87, 97, 99).
The testimony of this cause and effect is unchal26
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lenged. It is the te~timony of grocers, men who speak
from actual experience in the grocery business and not
from abstractions. It is clear fr01n this testimony that
in the competitive retail grocery business, a discount
from the price, even in cents or a fraction thereof, ·
normally results and did result in a price war, trying
to undersell the other fellow regardless of the actual
or statutory cost of the item sold. Particularly is this
so in the case of six per cent Inerchandise which Mr.
Bush affirms on page 152 of the Record when he says
he "stays~· with the lowest priced advertised, "particularly on six per cent merchandise."
\V" e believe the cases support our interpretation of
the intent requirement. In People v. Payless Drug, 143
P.2d 762, quoted at length in respondent's first brief, it
was held an intent to injure competition was proved
Ly testimony of competitors that their business fell off
as a result of defendant's price cutting, that a price
war resulted, and, that the natural effect of selling
below cost by one merchant was to lessen the business
of his competitors. On appeal the Supreme Court of
California, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 at 12, affirmed
relying on the statutory presumption of intent without
men(ion of the specific evidence of intent. However,
the court stated that by the presumption "The Legislature merely enacted into law what is common in human
experience, that when a person causes injury by his
act he should be deemed to intend such consequences
unless he can excuse or explain his conduct by facts
showing he had an innocent intent." (Emphasis added).
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Similar evidence was held sufficient to support an
injunction in People v. Gordon, 105 Cal. App. 2d 711,
234 P.2d 287. Contrary results were apparently reached
in Sandler v. ·Gordon, 94 Cal. App. 2d 254, 210 P.2d 314,
and Ell-is v. Dallas, 113 Cal. App. 2d 234, 248 P. 2d 63.
llowever in the former case the facts showed that apparently the alleged violator was in good faith attempting to meet the prices of his competitors and thus came
within a statutory exemption and in the latter case
the facts showed that when the price cutting took place
there were no competitors to injure in the area of defendant's store and therefore could be no intent to
injure competition. Balzer v. Caler, 11 Cal. 2d 724, 82
P.2d 19, also appears to reach a contrary result but it
was dependent in part on the recognized judicial policy
of supporting the trial court's decision on questions of
fact and seems in conflict with the later case of People
v. Payless Drug, supra.
In Dikeou, et al. v. Food Distributors' Association,
107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529, intent was found from evidence of injury to competitors, advertising the specific
reductions complained of to· new customers, lack of
cooperation in establishing cost surveys allowed under
the Colorado act and other evidence not specifically
enu1nerated in the Supreme Court opinion. The court
stated, "It may be presumed in a civil action that the
natural and probaJble consequences of the act were
intended by the actor."
The later Colorado case of Perkins v. King Soopers,
Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 221 P.2d 343, does not change the
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rules announced in the Dikeou ca8e for in the Perkins
case, unlike Dikeou and this case, no evidence was introduced to show the effect of the below cost sales. The
plaintiff relied exclusively on the statutory presumption
of intent and this was held to be insufficient in the
Perkins case. Board of Railroad Comm'rs v. Sawyers'
Stores, 114 Mont. 562, 138 P.2d 964, and State v. Twentieth Century Jlarket, 236 Wise. 215, 294 N.W. 875 are
like the Perkins case and distinguishable from the present one in that no evidence was offered of the actual
effect of the below cost sales of the defendant.
Also distinguishable are State ex rel Anderson v.
Commercial Ca-ndy Co., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P.2d 1034,
where defendants proved they came within an exemption to the statute, State ex rel Malone v. Fleming Co.,
164 Kan. 723, 192 P.2d 207, where the complaint was
held insufficient for indefiniteness, and Miller's Groceteria Co. v. Food Distributor's Association, 107 Colo.
113, 109 P.2d 637, where a judgment on the pleadings
was denied because the fact question of intent was in
lSSUe.

Finally, this Court has held that intent may be
pro\-ed frmn the circumstances and _ consequences of
actions of the defendant. In Hi-Land Dairyman's Association v. Cloverleaf Dairy, 107 Utah 68, 151 P.2d 710,
this Court relied on a quotation from Helmet Co. v.
Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 245 Fed. 831: "The defendant
is therefore chargeable with knowledge of the inevitaJble
consequences of such conduct, and so is open to the
inference that it intends its products to be confused
29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with and mistaken for complainant's products." It is
true that case involved a different aspect of unfair
competition, trade-marks, but the same intent to injure
a cornpetitor was a necessary element of the claimed
violation.
We respectfully submit that if we have not proved
the requisite intent in this case, there is no case in
which it can be proved, absent a stipulation by the defendant. In any case, the defendant can testify that
his only intent was to attract business, and, under the
present opinion of the Court, that alone would be enough
to exempt him from the operation of the statute regardless of the actual circumstances of the case. We
might say of this result: The construction was successful, the statute died. Therefore, we request the Court
to reconsider their discussion of" intent, to reverse the
present opinion as being in error, but in any event, to
modify the language used so that in the future the Act
can be enforced.
POINT V
THE COURT IGNORED AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD
OF PROOF OF THE VIOLATION, PROOF THAT THE
EFFECT WAS TO INJURE COMPETITION.

Section 13-5-7, U.C.A. 1953, after spelling out the
prohibited practice of selling below cost, continues:
" * * * for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition, or of misleading the public, or when the effect of selling, offering for sale, or advertising for sale such article,
product or commodity at less than cost thereof
to such vendor * * * may be substantially to
30
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le~~en c01npetition or tend to erPatp a monopoly
in any line of conuueree."

Thus, the . Act proYides that a violation may be
proved ( 1) by proof of intent to injure competition
plus proof of a below co~t sale, offer or advertisement
for sale, and also \2) by proof of a below cost sale,
offer or adYertisen1ent for sale plus proof that the
effect of ~uch practice was to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly. In our discussion of Point
IY, we haYe shown that the issuance of the green stamps
by Bush (the Lelow cost sale) had the effect of reducing the business of his competitors and causing an injurious price war.
The ~Iinnesota Unfair Practices Act is very similar
to the r tah Act and provides that a sale below cost
is unlawful if done "for the purpose or with the effect
of injuring competitors * * * ." The Supreme Court of
:Minnesota held in McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580,
29:2 xw 414:
"Sales below cost which have the effect of
injuring competition are prohibited regardless of
intent."
The same result was reached in May's Drug Stores v.
State Tax Commission, 242 Iowa 319, 45 NW 2d 245,
Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 SW 2d 733; and
Mcintire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A.2d 47.
\Ve submit that from the record of this case both
an intent to injure competition and that the effect of
defendant's actions was substantially to lessen competition has been proved. Proof of either is sufficient
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under the Act to constitute a violation. By completely
ignoring this aspect of the case, the Court has committed error.
POINT VI
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT
ARE TO PROHIBIT UNFAIR AND DISCRIMINATORY
PRACTICES BY WHICH FAIR AND HONEST COMPETI'l'ION IS DESTROYED OR PREVENTED AS WELL AS TO
SAFEGUARD THE PUBLIC AGAINST THE CREATION OR
PERPETRATION OF MONOPOLIES.

This Court has said in the instant case 'the declared
purpose of the Act [is] to safeguard the public against
·monopolies by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory
practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed."
It is the contention of petitioner that this interpretation is an unjustified restriction upon the plain
and unequivocal terms of the statute, which we herewith set forth:
"13-5-17. The legislature declared that the
purpose of this act is to safeguard the public
against the creation or perpetration of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by
prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices
by which fair and honest competition is destroyed
or prevented. This act shall be liberally construed
that its beneficial purposes may be subserved."
Plainly, the Legislature declared at least two distinct
purposes to be accomplished by the statute. One is
directed against the "creation or perpetration of monopolies" and the other "to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices
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by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or
prevented".
Even the prohibitory language of the Unfair Practices Act does not restrict the purposes of the statute
as this Court has done. Section 13-5-7, U.C.A. 195i~
declares a sale ·below cost to be illegal when the purpose of such a sale is to ( 1) injure cornpetitors and
destroy competition; (2) mislead the public; or
(3) when the effect of such a sale may be substantially
to lessen competition; or (4) when the effect of such
a sale may be to tend to create a monopoly. l~..,urther
more the policy section quoted above provides that the
Act 'shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be subserved. Certainly it does not subserve
the purposes of the statute to limit its application to
the prevention of monopolies.
To compress the language setting forth the purposes of the Act into a single concept is to deny substance and meaning to those words specifically referring to the fostering and encouraging of competition
by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices irrespectve of the creation or perpetration of monopolies.
Such a construction strips the statute of one of the
powers the Legislature designed it to have, viz., the
prevention of trade practices which are injurious to
retail merchandising, therefore injurious to the economy,
even though they may not be shown to create or perpetrate a monopoly. Statutes prohibiting sales below
cost are not merely anti-monopoly acts as this Court
infers but are manifold in their purposes. As set forth
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1n Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act, Sec. 100-30, Laws of
Wisconsin, as amended:
"The practice of selling certain i terns of
rnerchandise below cost in order to attract patronage is generally a form of deceptive advertising
and an unfair method of competition in commerce. Such practice causes commercial . dislocations, misleads the consummer, works back
against the farmer, directly burdens and obstructs
comrnerce and diverts business from dealers who
rnaintain a fair price policy. Bankruptcies among
merchants who fail because of the con1petition of
those who use such methods result in unemployrnent, disruption of leases, and nonpayment of
taxes a~d loans, and contribute to an inevitable
train of undesirable consequences including economic depression."
CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully submit
(1) that a two per cent cash discount given with an
item marked up the statutory six per cent does
reduce the price of the item below the minimum allowed by statute whether such a discount is customary or not and regardless of the
manner in which it is treated for accounting
purposes;
(2) that the below-cost provisions of the Unfair
Practices Act apply to each item sold and therefore the cost of each item must be computed
separately;
( 3) that it is erroneous and not according to law
to require the same burden of proof in this
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case, a civil action for injunctive relief, as in
a crilninal case ;
( 4) that the record conclusively shows the intent
of the defendant to injure cOin petition;
(5) that the record conclusively shows that the effect of defendant's actions was to injure competition;
(6) that the purpose of the Unfair Practices Act
is to promote fair methods of competition by
the prevention of unfair methods and is not
limited to the prevention of practices tending
to promote monopolies.
For the foregoing reasons, we petition the Court
for a rehearing of this matter so that the record may
be reconsidered and, upon further hearing, the errors
herein specified may be corrected and the decree of the.
trial court affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
H. R. WALDO, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
SHERMAN P. LLOYD
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN
Attorneys for Intervenors
and Respondents.
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